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The extensive use of modern
medical technology has caused
great concern regarding the care
of the terminally ill in our health
care facilities. Thus, the concern
for the rights and dignity of the
dying patient has become affixed
with the euthanasia dilemma. As
most of the recent literature
points out, the word euthanasia
means "happy or good" (eu-)
dea th (thana tos) . However, many
writers in the area of medical
ethics, such as Paul Ramsey, believe that the term " euthanasia"
is misleading because it is often
synonymous with mercy killing,
the direct termination of one's
life. Dr. Ramsey suggests that it
is "better to invent terms such
as agathanasia or bene-mori (happy or good death) to convey the
ethics and practice of only caring
for the dying if this is what is
meant."! Others, such as Arthur
J. D yck, prefer the term benemortasia in order to clarify the
distinction between terminating
a life and allowing or permitting
a person to die.2
Besides reformulating terms,
many ethicists are becoming
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aware of the philosophical presuppositions underlying ethical considerations regarding death. For
example, some of the proponents
of voluntary euthanasia identify
human with "free to choose;"
thus an individual has absolute
freedom to choose his own death.
This position says much about
the nature of humanhood and the
purpose of life. In an article entitled "Euthanasia" Peter Riga
states:
The arguments for positive and
n egative e uthanasia, for a ll prac·
tical purp03es , are a cad emic be cause we have already d ecid ed the
moral issue of human life : mora l
norm has become the wi ll of ma n
as d eterminative and not the myst e ry of man who must be protect ed
and respected if any soci ety is to
have any cohes ive ness. S ec ular hu mani sm has won hands down and
the on ly question left to the C hri s tian is how wi ll he react as an in dividual and as a community ..!

The distinctions and arguments
for both euthanasia and benemortasia have no meaning unless we
address ourselves first to the
meaning of human life and death.
This article, then, will attempt to
explicate a J udaeo-Christian approach to life-death decisionmaking through a reflection on
the mystery of humanhood and
its implications for human life
and death.
I. The Purpose of Humankind
The traditional definition of
man as a rational animal is inadequate. Yet science has been laboring out of this limited scholastic definition since its origin in
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Greek philosophy centuries ago.
How one views a human being
will certainly predicate in some
way how one will relate to that
being. Rabbi Abraham H eschel
gives us a more biblical view of
man when he writes:
Who is man? A being in travail
with God's dream of a wo rld red eemed. of r eco nciliation of h eaven
and earth. of a mankind which is
truly His image . refl ecting His wisdom , justice and compassion. God's
dream is not to be alone, to h ave
mankind a s a partne r in the drama
of continuous creation. By whatever we do. by every act we carry
out. we eith er advance or obstruct.
the drama of red emption ; we eithPr
reduce o r enhance th e power of
evil 4

This Christian VlSlOn of man
should be based upon the biblical
perception of humankind called
from all eternity to be a partner
with God in building the future
of creation. A human being is a
being in dialogue with God and
fellowman. God wishes to save
us and make us holy, not as -individual human beings without
any mutual bond, but as a group
of people bound together to serve
him in justice and in truth. ' If
this is true, then man can never
be defined, conclusions can never
be rea c h ed, moral decisions
should never be made that do not
consider man in that total context of relationship with God and
relationship with fellowman. This
J udaeo-Christian vision of man
has significant implications for
human life and death.
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II. Implications for Human
Life and Death
A. Physical Life is not the
Greatest Value.
For the believer there has always been more to existence than
just biological life. The traditional definition of death in theology
as "the separation of body and
soul" is inadequate in calling attention to the positive reality that
death signifies for the believer;
death is not the end but a process of growth. Yet, the body-soul
dualism of Greek philosophy still
continues to influence the health
care delivery system in the U ni ted States. Dr. Elisabeth KublerRoss has pointed out that dying
people are given the greatest care
of t heir biological and physical
needs, yet are left alone in their
hospital beds fearful and frightened.6 The biblical view of man is
not a soul imprisoned in a body,
but rather man is viewed as a
unified being-a whole person. As
Karl Barth writes, "A person's
soul is the specific life of this person and is to be distinguished
from his body (flesh) but not
separate from it." 7 Thus, in the
biblical view a human person is a
totality, a composite and cannot
be dissected into parts. Any care
of the sick and dying must take
a wholistic approach and not
merely center on one aspect of a
person's being. Therefore, to
squeeze every ounce of life out of
a body is not in keeping with the
biblical view of man.
Biblical evidence establishes
that God was considered immortal and man mortal. God
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opted for man and, therefore, man
is called in this life to opt for
God. It is in being co-partners
with God that merits eternal union with God. Barth writes, "After man's death, God will be the
future only of what man will have
been-the hope that shines on
this his limited and now completed existence as such. It will
be God's concern and his only
concern that this his mortal being put on immortality."8 Thus,
modern theology must begin with
this positive scriptural view of
man in explicating a t heology of
death.
B. Human Life has Meaning
in Relation to Others.
Man is not merely an individual or an island unto himself. The
answer to who we are embraces
all humankind. Therefore, life-

death decisions cannot be made
on the basis of an individual's
physical needs alone. These decisions must be made in light of the
effects they will have upon family and society. The Christian
view of a human being is a being
who finds meaning in being for
others. Therefore the "we have a
right to do with our bodies what
we want" or "we can make decisions in terms of our own needs
and comfort" attitudes are highly individualistic and in direct
contradiction to the Christian vision of man that speaks about
living for and with others. "Greater love than this no man has than
he lay down his life for his
friends." (John 15:13) This realization calls for the recognition
that moral decisions are not mereLinacre Quarterly

ly individual decisions but must
be made against a broader context-human beings are relational beings.
C. Human Life is not Temporal
but Transcendent.
Scriptural evidence and Christian tradition have established
that man is a transcendent being
-a being called to unlimited
growth in the love of God and
fellowman. This growth far surpasses what reason or science
alone can determine.
Eye has not seen nor ear h ea rd, or
has it even e ntered into the hearts
of man the things that God has pre pared for those who love him. (l
Cor . 2:9)

Does this transcendent view of
human life pervade our reflection
and the practical life-death decisions we make when it comes to a
question of prolongation or termination of life? Life-death decisions can't consider man simply
in terms of his temporal destiny.
Physical life cannot be the ultimate end value by which we make
decisions or evaluate our success.
Eternal hope has to be the characteristic of those who embrace
a who lis tic and Christian vision
of man as God's "agents of hope
actualizing the good as they share
in the development of history and
in the building of the human community."'!
D . Human Life is
Ultimately Precious.
Biblical evidence is explicit
about God calling each of us to
existence with a divine message
and plan. Each person is unique.
November, 1975

Each life is ultimately precious
because each has received a divine
summons and all have a place in
the mission of the world. Each
has been called by God to fulfill
that mission. What this means
in regard to life-death decisions,
whether at the beginning of life
or at the end, is that we can never evaluate or make those decisions in terms of degree of development, in terms of an ability
or talent that one creature promises over others. Our dignity,
worth and value are based on an
invitation to life extended by God
himself. In terms of ethical considerations this means that all
human beings are called to unlimited growth in love with God
and fellowman as unified relational beings. It is this view of
man that will enable us to come
to a more complete understanding of human death.
III. Human Death
In our society the current lifedeath decision-making is in terms
of viewing human life as a biological phenomenon. One such proof
of this can be found in the widely
clinical definitions of death in use
today. To define death as the
cessation of respiratory, cardiac
or brain activity can never fully
be the total reality of human
death. Death is a process that involves the total person, not just
one's body. Rev. Anthony Kosnik
states it in another way:
To diagnose medically that a person is in irreversible coma is not to
pronounce this person dead. Using
cessation of brain activity as a criterion of death is to make a theo-
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logical judgment that the essence of
man is in his consciousness; such
a view comes not from the labora tory but from the belief system. To
d efine d eath in terms of the irreversible cessation of vital functions Or
brain activity is like d efining day-light as the cessation of nighttime.
It may be true, but it is a far cry
from th e total r eality that is occuring. I Q

When a culture identifies clinical
death with personal death, as ours
does, one reduces man to an empirical phenomenon that can be
clinically verifiable and tested.
Karl Rahner expresses a positive Christian approach to death :
"What is human in death is that
one's personal self-affirmation
and self-realization achieve an absolute determination."l l Ladislaus Boros further elucidates this
thought: "In death we achieve
total self-encounter, universal
presence to the world and a meeting with God making our first
completely free personal act possible."l l These insights explain
death as a mystery, a positive
transformation of life--a change,
not a cessation or termination of
life. For the believer death is that
final, definitive, irreversible orientation of our relational life towards God and fellow man. J3 At
death a person's orientation and
relationship with God and others
is fixed at least in terms of that
fundamental d ire c t ion-that
one's transcendent life has taken.
Death is the total self-realization
and self-affirmation of who we
are created to be.
Our attitude toward death has
been that of fear. This fear be-
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came more paranoid when th€ologians and fiery preachers contemplated the so-called celestial
realms taking mental inventories
of t he furniture of heaven and t he
t emperatures of hell. Patrick Fannon summarizes the recent theological reinterpretation of eschatological symbols. This interpretation ref use s to limit eschatology to the " hereafter" and
seeks to relate these symbols to
everyday life "which affirms that
our eternity is shared and molded in the life that we live here
and now. "l~
It is this added faith dimension
of the process of death t hat can
help us overcome the fearful
clinging to physical life that has
justified our excessive efforts of
preserving physical life at all
costs. Rather, we are called as
believers to live t he promise of
eternal life t hat is the ultimate
significance of death.
IV. Ethical Principles Concerning
Life-Death Decisions
A. Respect Life.
From the J udaeo-Christian perspective of humankind as "being
in travail with God's dream of a
world redeemed," l; God has absolute dominion over life. It is
God who gives ultimate meaning
to life. Life is a gift from the
Creator and, therefore, we cannot
do with life as we please. As copartners with God in the continuous drama of creation we
must be about building a future
for all of redeemed mankind! We
are stewards of God's gift of life
and, therefore, interpreters of
God's will in difficult situations.
Linacre Quarterly

We are not masters over the gift
of life; rather human life is ultimately precious, to be reverenced
as "mystery" and whose most
substantive meaning and value is
relational. Therefore, respect for
life is an absolute principle without exception and morally binding upon all in each and every
life-death situation and decision!

£lict of life situations such as the
Christian martyrs who chose to
die out of love for God. What the
fifth commandment has traditionally meant in the context of
life-death decisions is that we
cannot indiscriminately terminate
human life for selfish, utilitarian,
or purely merciful reasons.

B. Thou Shall not Kill.
The fifth commandment has
largely been interpreted as a
negative prohibition against the
intentional taking of innocent life
without due proportionality. In
regard to medical ethics, this
meant that one could not use
positive means of intervention.
Scripture scholars have found
through their studies of the Decalogue that the fifth commandment originally prohibited the ancient Israelites from taking the
law into their own hands and inflicting violence or death upon
their fellow Jews without approval of the law, the community
or God. This commandment did
not prohibit all taking of human
life as is evident in the biblical
accounts of wars, but the fifth
commandment did instill a positive respect for human life as
having inalienable worth. 16 No
life was to be arbitrarily terminated by individual private decision. However, there is a long
history of the Church's acknowledgement of man's right to take
life in certain instances i.e., just
war, capital punishment, legitimate self-defense, in the line of
duty as a police officer or presidential body guard, and in con-

C. Euthanasia in All Its Forms
is Forbidden.
Directive number 28 of the
Ethical and Religious Directives
for Catholic Health Care Facilities explicitly states:
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Euthanasia ("mercy killing" ) in all
its forms is forbidden. The failure
to supply the ordinary means of
preserving life is equivalent to eu·
thanasia. However, ne i the r the
physician nor the patient is obliged
to the use of extraordinary means. 1 i

Father Gerald Kelly in 1954
gave a definition of ordinary and
extraordinary means that is still
widely used by moralists today:
As regards hospital procedures, ordinary means of preserving life are
ali medicines, treatments, and op·
erations, which offer a reasonable
hope of benefit for the patient and
which can be obtained and used
without excessive expense, pain, or
other inconvenience. 1S

The example that Father Kelly
uses is that of a normally healthy
patient who is facing a crisis of
pneumonia yet has a reasonable
hope for recovery by means of
certain drugs (penicillin) and
oxygen. 19
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E. Extraordinary Means May
Be Used.
In contradistinction to ordinary means of preserving life are
extraordinary means:
By these we mean all medicines ,
treatments, and ope rations, which
can not be obtained Or used without
excessive expense, pain , or oth er
inconvenience, or which if used.
would not offe r a reasonable hope
of benefit.20

An example of using extraordinary means would be the case of
a 90 year old man hospitalized
with a serious cardiac ailment and
who has suffered cardiac arrest
nine times in the last month. To
continue to use the defibrillator
to shock the man back into existence would be an extraordinary
means of preserving life because
of the lack of reasonable hope of
recovery.
It is important to note that
ordinary and extraordinary means
should not be evaluated solely in
terms of what is common or unusual. There can be no simple list
of ordinary or extraordinary
means that neatly catagorizes
modern medical procedures into
two comprehensive pigeon holes.
Rather, the determination of
what is ordinary and must be
used with what is extraordinary
and may be used will need to be
made in each instance in light of
these suggested criteria:
1. The Clinical Condition and
Prognosis of the Patient.

Medical judgments should be
made as to the condition and
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prognosis of the patient. Is there
reasonable hope for recovery? Is
theis a critical care situation or a
terminal care situation? A critical
care situation is one where there
is uncertainty about the patient's
prognosis and the care given is
for the purpose of prolonging life.
For example, a victim of an automobile accident is brought to a
hospital emergency room with
severe brain damage and the
physicians assess the amount of
cerebral injury but are not certain that the patient will respond
to treatment. The procedures and
methods of treatment are for the
purpose of suppotring and maintaining life. Terminal care situations would be those cases where
there is no favorable prognosis
or reasonable hope for recovery;
for example, a person in an irreversible comatose condition.
2. Reasonable Desires of the
Patient and Family.
Death is not simply a passive
process but the supreme moment
of involvement and self-expression of which all of life has been
a preparation. 2 1 The patient
needs time to prepare for death,
time to take care of his or her
personal matters. The medical
staff must be completely honest
with both the patient and the
family members. Thus, if possible,
both the patient and the family
members should be involved in
the life-death decision-making
process. If we are truly relational
beings, then the patient and family ordinarily are better evaluators
of the relational meaning of life
Linacre Quarterly

and better interpreters of God's
will for them. However, the patient and family cannot reasonably and responsibly make these
decisions without clinical input.
Pope Pius XII emphatically
points out that the patient and
family have rights and duties to
be involved in life-death decisionmaking.
The t e c h n i qu e of r esuscitation
which concerns us h e re does not
contain anything immoral in itself.
The refore the patie nt, if h e were
capable of making a personal d ecision, co uld lawfully use it and .
consequently, give the doctor p ermission to use it.
The rights
and duties of the family d epend in
general upon the presumed will of
the unconscious patient 'if h e is of
age and "sui juris." Where the
proper and indepe ndent duty of the
family is co nce rned. they are usual 'ly bound only to use o rdinary
means. Consequently, if it appears
that the attempt at resuscita tion
constitutes in reality such a burden
for the family that one can not in
all conscience impose it upon them.
they can lawfully insist that the
doctor should discontinue these attempts, and the doctor can lawfully
comply. 22

It is the responsibility of the
health care team to properly inform and prepare the patient and
family for death. Care given must
be committed to the total well
being of the patient.

3. Societal Considerations.
As was previously stated, as
relational beings we cannot make
life-death decisions in terms of
our own individual needs and desires. We must take into consideration the effect the means used
November, 1975

in the care of terminally ill persons will have upon the hospital
and the community. Could not
an over-extensive use of respirators and other life-sustaining
equipment continue to skyrocket
costs of health insurance prohibiting the poor and indigent
from sharing in health insurance
benefits? With excessive prolonging of death do we not deprive
other sick people the necessary
beds and medical equipment
needed for their recovery? We
cannot make moral decisions in a
vacuum. What we do has a profound effect on many others.
Should not the effect of our actions upon society be a very Important moral consideration?
In light of the preceding considerations some guidelines can be
drawn regarding the use of ordinary and extraordinary means.
In critical care situations, every
reasonable effort in relation to
the patient's condition and prognosis, and the legitimate desires
of the patient, family and society
is to be made to support and
maintain life. In terminal care
situations: a) if the patient is
conscious, particular attention
should be given to provide the
emotional, social and spiritual
support the patient may need to
prepare well for death. Appropriate measures may be taken to
relieve pain and to assure that
the basic bodily processes are
continued without undue stress
or difficulty. Special efforts to
maintain or prolong life need not
be encouraged if the patient so
indicates. b) if the patient is ir275

reversibly comatose, special efforts to maintain, prolong or revive a mere biological existence
ought not to be encouraged, and
with the consent of the family,
all artificial means that may be
supporting life may be withdrawn.

v. May Positive Means Be
Used to Hasten Death?
In surveying the current literature on the care of the dying one
may draw the following conclusions: 1) There is agreement
among theologians that extraordinary means need not be used to
prolong the life of the dying.
Some theologians, such as Daniel
Maguire, conclude that once the
death process has begun it may
well be immoral to attempt
through extraordinary procedures
to interfere. 2.l 2) Positive means
may be used to minimize pain
even though indirectly this may
contribute to the shortening of
life. 3) Regarding the morality
of using positive means to intervene in the life process, there is a
growing recognition that at some
point the distinction between acts
of commission and omission loses
moral significance. Kieran Nolan
concludes that "positive assistance to the dying process definitely seems to be encompassed
in the reasonable understanding
of the Christian and human right
to die. What this positive assistance to dying means will have to
be determined from person to
person and not from 'case' to
'case."'24 For Dr. Paul Ramsey,
positive means to hasten the dying process are used only in high-
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ly exceptional cases: "a) when a
patient is irretrievably inaccessible to human care and b) prolonged dying in which it is medically impossible to keep severe
pain at bay."2i Daniel Maguire
rejects the absolute stand that
direct means may never be used
on the grounds that this practical
prohibition has not been proved
and cannot be and therefore we
can proclaim moral freedom to
terminate life directly in certain
cases. 26
In regard to the conclusions
of these three renowned theologians, there are some very serious
questions to be considered. How
does one clinically verify when a
patient is irretrievably inaccessible to human care? What guidelines does one use to establish
when the dying process actually
begins? Even if one could clinically verify when a person is inacessible to further care isn't there
more to the process of death? It
is this writer's opinion that the
presumption should be in favor of
the person that is still potentially
alive. If we are to respect the
mystery of life and death then
we · should admit the possibility
that this person is still alive and
can be of further service to his
fellow man. In theory the distinction between acts of commission
and omission loses moral significance in terms of a comatose terminally ill patient. However, on
the human and practical plane,
the ambiguity of the terms, the
lack of adequate criteria for determining the beginning of the
death process, and the danger to
Linacre Quarterly

society make widespread use of
positive means to hasten death
unsuitable for pastoral application at present.27 4) There is almost universal rejection of euthanasia, i.e., the termination of
human life for selfish, utilitarian
or mercy reasons.
It has been the intent of this
paper to criticize the free will
theory as the moral norm for decision-making, the bod y - sou I
dualism which still greatly influences the medical profession, and
clinical evidence as the sole criterion for making decisions regarding death. In place of the
above, a basic anthropology based
upon the biblical view of humanhood as a unified, relational, ultimately precious and transcendent
being was articulated. From this
theological perspective, principles
and guidelines were suggested for
a J udaeo-Christian approach to
life-death decision making.

In light of the above discussion
the following recommendations
are offered: 1. The fostering of
continuing education programs
for medical personnel that will
communicate theological, psychological and clinical insights on
how to aid the terminally ill person to prepare for and to personally participate in the growth
process which is death. 2. For
hospitals to form special committees (or medical-moral committees) to review life-death decisions that have been made, especially the policies for "code
alerts" for terminally ill and
comatose patients. 3. DevelopNovember, 1975

ment of a special task force to
work in opposition of proposed
Euthanasia legislation that undermines respect for life. 4. Formation of an ongoing program of
conscience formation and moral
development for medical personnel. This will aid in understanding the moral decision-making
process.
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